The U.S. military has used force or the threat of force to protect its energy interests around the world, primarily in the Middle East, for more than five decades, safeguarding foreign oil sources and the sea lanes through which they pass.

According to Roger Stern, an energy professor with the National Energy Policy Institute who also teaches about energy and national security at the University of Tulsa, the cost of keeping a U.S. military presence—particularly naval forces— in the Persian Gulf from 1976 to 2007 was $7.3 trillion. The policy was formulated during World War II when the U.S. battled with Japan over oil shipping choke points in the Pacific. The approach was adopted by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations when Soviet adventurism in Iran and pan-Arab unrest in the Middle East threatened the Persian Gulf oil deliveries.

It was made explicit in 1980 by the Carter administration in response to the Soviet Union’s encroachment in the Persian Gulf. Oil is vital not only to American national security but also U.S. allies’ security because their economies are heavily dependent on petroleum imports. As a result, protection of the world’s oil facilities became part of U.S. national security strategy.

“We believe safe, uninterrupted flow in the commerce of petroleum is one vital to the U.S. and secondarily to our friends and allies,” said Richard Zilmer, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general. “The United States will always play a role in ensuring the safe transit of petroleum as well as commerce across the sea lanes. We have a vital interest of freedom of navigation around the world that has always been an interest of the United States.”

U.S. military operations and protecting access to oil are not always directly related.But history has shown oil to be an important factor in determining U.S. foreign policy and military strategy, from protecting oil disruption by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the 1990s to today’s redeployment of some military assets to the Asia Pacific region to ensure maritime stability and the freedom of navigation there.

Stern said the U.S. government’s fear of peak oil, the point when maximum oil extraction is reached and terminal decline begins, and Soviet aggression for oil started in the 1950s, but that this growing trend of irrational fears about oil supplies did not immediately translate into military actions to secure oil. “There was a great deal of military activity and the country was in permanent military mobilization, but not that much mobilization had to deal with oil until 1970,” he said.

Even though the U.S. is becoming less dependent on foreign oil thanks to a surge in domestic production, it still imports more than half of its oil. Because of oil discoveries around the globe, the U.S. also increasingly devotes military resources to protect oil-producing regions that are relatively more stable than the Middle East such as West Africa. The stakes are high in the rush to secure oil resources in that region, which has led to a perceived competition between U.S. and China, as both states compete to secure their share of oil supplies.

One of the earliest uses of the military in defending U.S. oil interests came during the Suez Crisis in 1956, when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser took steps to nationalize the Suez Canal, a vital oil choke point co-owned by the British and French. “The immediate threat is to the oil supplies to Western Europe, a great part of which flows through the Canal,” said Prime Minister Anthony Eden of England to U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. “We are all agreed that we cannot afford to allow Nasser to seize control of the Canal in this way, in defiance of international agreements.”

Britain and France wanted to assert their power over the canal through military action and found support from Israel, which was constantly threatened by Egypt. The parties agreed on a plan to take over the Sinai Peninsula and the canal. The major operations were undertaken by Israeli forces who stopped short of the canal to allow the Anglo-French forces to seize it. The U.S. opposed the military action and called for a political solution.

The U.S. stance since 1956 would change over the next coming decades; the 1960s saw a decade of relative calm, while the 1970s and beyond introduced the U.S. to new difficulties and conflicts.

1970s

The 1970s opened with a decade of new vulnerabilities for the United States and its national security interests. Until 1972 the U.S. relied on the British for security in the Gulf and lacked a significant military presence in the region. It also relied on Iranian leader Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi even as he was growing increasingly unpopular in his own country. “The British left, and then we [U.S.] delegated that protection of U.S. interests to the Shah [the ruler of Iran]. …We really looked to him to provide U.S. security of U.S. interests in the Gulf,” said Gary Sick, a former member of the National Security Council.

After that, the U.S. slowly had to assert its influence in the region because of the vacuum left by the British. There was a need to contain the Soviet Union’s encroachment towards the Middle East. But before the British departure, in May 1972, President Richard Nixon traveled to Tehran to meet with the shah. Afterward, Nixon significantly boosted military aid to Iran as part of a proxy strategy to maintain the safe flow of oil from the region.

The U.S. did not have significant military installations in the Middle East throughout the 1970s. The oil price surge caused by the Arab oil embargo, which began in October 1973 and went through March 1974, led U.S. administrations to develop foreign and military policies that prioritized protecting oil in the Gulf. “When you are being strangled, it is a question of either dying or living. And when you use the word ‘strangulation’ in relationship to the existence of the United States or its nonexistence, I think the public has to have a reassurance, our people, that we are not going to permit America to be strangled to death,” President Gerald Ford said on Jan. 23, 1975.

On Aug. 24, 1977, President Jimmy Carter was even more aggressive, signing Presidential Directive 18, which authorized the Pentagon to create a Rapid Deployment Force to respond to any oil disruptions in the Gulf region and described the force as light with strategic mobility and independent from overseas bases. By 1979, the uprisings in Iran had turned into a full-fledged revolution; the shah fled the country and was replaced by a virulently anti-U.S. religious cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Within a year, 66 Americans were taken hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, followed by a 444-day hostage crisis.

In response to incidents such as the Iranian revolution, the standoff between South Yemen and North Yemen, and the Soviet Union’s threat to Saudi Arabia, the Carter administration sent an aircraft carrier group from the Pacific theater to the Arabian Sea.

Fearing disruptions in its oil supply from the Soviet Union and unstable regimes, the U.S. increased its emphasis on maintaining a long-term military presence in the Persian Gulf in late 1979, allocating seven prepositioned ships with mechanized equipment, ammunition fuel and other supplies, as well as 300 jet transports and 500 turboprop transports that were made available for airlift. There were tactical air force contingencies that would be able to reach the Middle East within hours. B-52 bombers were conducting reconnaissance flights into the Indian Ocean for the first time and an amphibious ready group of 1,800 marines detachment were deployed into the area also for the first time.

1980s

This militarized energy policy was formalized by President Jimmy Carter in January 1980 when, in response to the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamist revolution in Iran, he announced that the secure flow of Persian Gulf oil was in “the vital interests of the United States of America” and that, to protect oil interests, the U.S. would use “any means necessary, including military force.”

Carter’s principle of using force to protect the flow of oil became known as the Carter Doctrine. It was later cited by President George H.W. Bush to justify American intervention in the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 and provided the underlying strategic rationale for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The U.S. also engaged in several cases of preventing oil from falling into the hands of unstable regimes as well as the freedom of navigation. On Aug. 8, 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced the deployment of two AWACS electronic surveillance planes, eight F-15 fighter jets and ground logistical support forces to assist oil-rich Chad against Libyan forces. In March 1986, after Libyan missiles fired at U.S. forces engaging in freedom of navigation exercises around the Gulf of Sidra in the Mediterranean Sea, the U.S. retaliated with missile strikes that shot down two Libyan jets.

By 1983, Reagan took the first steps toward transforming a rapid deployment force that the Pentagon had established into a much larger permanent unified command, the United States Central Command, or CENTCOM, carving out a geographical area of responsibility in the Middle East from regions previously served by European and Pacific Commands.

The Tanker Wars from 1984 to 1988 were a turning point for the U.S. in its direct confrontation with Iran over protecting oil supplies. During that period, the Iran-Iraq War was at its height. Iraqi forces attacked Iran in 1980 when Saddam Hussein saw an opportune moment as Iran was transitioning from its revolution. The U.S. was supporting Iraq and Iran laid mines in the Persian Gulf to disrupt Kuwaiti oil tankers as a response to Kuwait’s economic assistance to the Saddam Hussein regime. The U.S. responded with Operation Earnest Will from July 1987 to September 1988 to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers and provide military escorts through the Persian Gulf and to de-mine the gulf.

“[The U.S. is] fundamentally, irrevocably committed to maintaining the free flow of oil through the gulf,” said Vice President George H.W. Bush in April 1986 to a group of American businessmen in Saudi Arabia.

After the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine in the Persian Gulf on April 14, 1988, the U.S launched Operation Praying Mantis, in which the U.S. Navy attacked two Iranian oil platforms and destroyed 25 percent of the Iranian navy.

1990s

In the 1990s, U.S. officials started to express interest in other major oil-producing regions besides the Persian Gulf, including the Caspian Sea basin in Central Asia, as well as Africa and Latin America. President Bill Clinton sought to exploit the energy potential of the Caspian basin and established military ties with future suppliers, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgia, to deter instabilities in the region.

According to Michal Klare, a Columbia University professor in peace and world security studies, Clinton was the first to champion construction of a pipeline from Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, to Ceyhan in Turkey and took steps to protect that conduit by boosting the military capabilities of the countries involved. President George W. Bush later continued the effort, increasing military aid to these countries and deploying American combat advisers.

With the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces beginning on Aug. 2, 1990, President George H.W. Bush ordered forward deployment of U.S. armed forces into the Persian Gulf region to help defend Saudi Arabia. The U.S. demanded that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. Iraq’s refusal led to the launch of Operation Desert Storm on Jan. 16, 1991, as aircraft of the U.S. and its coalition of allies attacked Iraqi forces in Iraq and Kuwait in what became known as the first Gulf War.

The U.S. victory generated animosity in Iraq, leading to an attempted car bomb intended to kill the elder Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April 1993. In response, Clinton ordered a cruise missile strike against the Iraqi Intelligence Service building in Baghdad two months later.

2000s

After the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, global terrorist organizations rapidly expanded their targeting of petroleum extraction, refining and transport infrastructure, among other targets. Concerned that such terrorist activities could paralyze allies that lacked counterterrorism capabilities, the U.S. expanded its new “War on Terrorism” around the globe to help allies prevent the proliferation of terrorist organizations.

The U.S. still maintained a strong presence in the Persian Gulf but, because West Africa and South America have seen an increase in exports to the U.S., they also have seen a surge in American military’s interest in protecting the region.

Between late 2002 and early 2003, the U.S. sent Special Forces advisers to train 4,000 Colombian soldiers in counterinsurgency warfare to protect a 500-mile pipeline that transports more than 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day and was attacked at least 170 times in 2001. While the U.S. receives only a small amount of its oil from Colombia, the pipeline was owned in part by a Los Angeles-based company.

The Pentagon also provided military aid to Angola and Nigeria and continues to help them with training and recruiting. Meanwhile, the U.S. hoped to establish permanent bases in the region, with a focus in Western African countries including Senegal, Ghana, Mali, Kenya and Uganda.

The U.S. acquired basing rights and access to airfields in Djibouti, Uganda, Mali, Senegal and Gabon, as well as port facilities in Morocco and Tunisia. In addition, it also expanded its covert intelligence operations across Africa in the name of combatting terrorism. By expanding its military presence in Africa, Washington hoped to ensure the free flow of African oil.

In 2005, the U.S. launched the Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative to help Nigeria, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and other West African governments deal with transnational threats, including the protection of harbors, ships and oil platforms. On Oct.1, 2008, the U.S. established AFRICOM, or Africa Command, in part because of the continent’s strategic stores of oil and mineral deposits and its position along key shipping lanes.

2010s

In 2011, during Operation Odyssey Dawn, coalition forces enforced U.S. Security Council Resolution 1973 with bombing of government forces in oil-rich Libya as they tried to suppress a rebellion. In the same year, the U.S. sent in combat troops to Nigeria and Uganda as advisers.

Since late 2011, the U.S. has been rebalancing to the Asia Pacific, where the world’s emerging economic powers are aggressively pursuing energy to fuel their growths. Countries like China, India, Vietnam and the Philippines are in heated disputes over the oil-rich South China Sea in Western Pacific. Fearing the escalation of ongoing disputes could lead to larger armed clashes that will disrupt the freedom of navigation, the U.S. has been developing new naval capabilities and incrementally deploying more ships to the Pacific in order to secure the vital see lanes and choke points. The U.S. is also in discussion with Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines regarding reusing some long-shuttered military bases and facilities.

China sees the South China Sea as a second Persian Gulf in terms of future oil capacity, and it is being more assertive in claiming the region, both diplomatically and militarily. The Beijing government is also developing long-range anti-ship missiles and modernizing its South Sea Fleet, sparking concerns in the U.S. and among its less-powerful regional allies, which also largely depend on oil imports.

Asia’s growing appetite for oil

Asia’s fast-track economic growth, driven primarily by the region’s leading emerging economies like China and India, is creating a massive surge in demand for the energy needed to fuel the expansion, especially oil. A recent report released by the National Bureau of Asian Research called Asia the “ground zero” for growth in global energy and commodity markets, indicating that the region will account for more than 85 percent of the increase in demand for oil over the next 20 years.

China, India, Japan, South Korea and other Asian countries are still heavily dependent on oil imports from the Persian Gulf and will remain so for decades. At the same time, the United States is becoming less dependent on oil from the Middle East as a result of the increasing its domestic drilling capacity. Many energy and security experts warn this “eastward shift’” will alter the global balance of power as China and other Asian nations compete with the U.S. for influence and access to oil. China’s surging demand, in particular, has brought it into conflict with other countries as it seeks short- and long-term supplies of oil, often in unstable and developing nations.

A landmark report released on Dec. 9, 2012 by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence warns that China’s quest for oil and other sources of energy will be one of the key “new sources of friction in a resource constrained world’’ in the coming decades.

“China is building up its naval power and developing land-bound energy transportation routes to diversify its access to energy,’’ increasing the potential for disputes, according to the report, titled “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds.’’

Oil, gas and conflicts of interests in the South China Sea

The Philippines and its neighboring countries rely on the U.S. military to ensure maritime peace and stability in the South China Sea. Above: USNS Charles Drew, a U.S. Navy ammunition ship, parked at Subic Bay, Philippines on Nov. 26, 2012.

The South China Sea, stretching from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Taiwan, has become a flashpoint in this conflict because of the vast supplies of oil and natural gas it contains. Since the 1970s, countries in the area such as China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines claim part or all of the water and the islands and resources they contain, prompting disputes over borders and access to the oil. In recent years, the area has become even more of a geopolitical flash point, as Vietnam and the Philippines accuse China of unfairly expanding into the area by imposing unilateral fishing bans, arresting Vietnamese and Filipino fishermen and increasing coastal patrols in the region.

Meanwhile, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy is also developing anti-ship missiles and modernizing its South Sea Fleet. On July 24, 2012, the Beijing government established a military garrison in Hainan Province to oversee the intensely disputed oil-and-gas-rich Paracel and Spratly Islands. Last November, China issued its new passport, which showed almost the entire South China Sea as being within its territorial boundaries. The passport also indicated that Taiwan, another claimant in the South China Sea, is part of China’s territory. Tension also exists in the East China Sea where the dispute over the ownership of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands between China and Japan has been escalating since August, resulting in the rise of nationalism in both countries even as they elected new top leaders in recent months. China, after repeatedly sending surveillance aircraft into the disputed airspace and drawing quick responses from the Japanese air force, finally flew its own J-10 jet fighters into the airspace over the East China Sea on Jan. 10. Neither side fired a shot, but the friction renewed speculation over China’s tougher stance on foreign policy.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration agency estimates that as Asia’s demand for oil continues to rise rapidly, conflicts caused by ownership disputes in the South China Sea will escalate as all countries in the region try to gain an upper hand in securing energy to fuel their future growth. That, in turn, has drawn the attention of the United States, which is building up its military force in the region to ensure the freedom of navigation and to prevent an escalation of ongoing conflicts. However, according to the “Global Trends 2030” report, tensions—particularly within China—will likely grow over the US role in the region. “Chinese strategists worry that China’s dependence on the US for sea lane security will be a strategic vulnerability for China in a future conflict, such as over Taiwan, where the US might impose an oil embargo,” the report said.

The U.S. “Rebalances’’ Its Military: The New Shift To The East

The United States has increasingly been drawn into the escalating conflict over the South China Sea, even as it is trying to stay out of it.

In fall 2011, the Obama administration announced a major strategic effort known as the “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia.

“For the United States, this reflects a broader shift. After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region,” said President Barack Obama in an address to the Australian Parliament in November 2011.

The administration will prioritize the Asia Pacific region in its foreign and economic policies, and intensify its military role there. For the Pentagon, the rebalance can be measured by the increased deployment of Navy ships to the Pacific Command’s area of responsibility from elsewhere in the world, including six aircraft carriers and an increased number of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The rebalance also means the development of new capabilities to contain China’s anti-ship missiles, strengthened regional partnerships and alliances, an increase in the number and size of joint military exercises in the Pacific, and more U.S. Navy visits to the regional ports.

Obama emphasized that the United States will play a larger, long-term role in shaping the region in the future. “As the world’s fastest-growing region — and home to more than half the global economy — the Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and that’s creating jobs and opportunity for the American people.” Obama said. In a speech delivered at the Shangri-La Security Dialogue last June, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said America’s fate is “inexorably linked” with the Asia Pacific region, leading to “more than six decades of U.S. military presence and partnership.”

“We take on this role not as a distant power, but as part of the Pacific family of nations,” said Panetta, “Our goal is to work closely with all of the nations of this region to confront common challenges and to promote peace, prosperity, and security for all nations in the Asia-Pacific region.”

The strategic shift comes as the Pentagon draws down the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and plans to incrementally deploy 60 percent of the naval ships to the Pacific by 2020, a shift of from the current 50 percent. The Pentagon also has announced new Marine rotational deployments to Australia, new littoral combat ship deployments to Singapore and the possibility of new military-to-military cooperation with the Philippines. With possible reductions in overall U.S. defense spending looming, Obama has publicly assured allies in the region that the U.S. military presence in Asia will only be strengthened. Panetta and other senior U.S. officials, however, have been careful to say that the U.S. will not take sides in the South China Sea disputes.

“We do not take a position on competing territorial claims over land features and have no territorial ambitions in the South China Sea; however, we believe the nations of the region should work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation, without threats, and without the use of force,’’ said State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said in a release on Aug. 3, 2012.

Panetta and senior military officials say the shift in military deployments is not meant to confront or contain China’s growth but rather to protect the free flow of commerce and shipping. They have not threatened the possible use of U.S. force to prevent the escalation of ongoing conflicts. Instead, Washington is encouraging regional countries to develop a universal code of conduct and respect international laws.

What The Shift Means For the U.S. – And The World

Some high-level U.S. officials, including State Secretary Hillary Clinton, have described the strategic shift as a “pivot’’ to Asia, while Panetta and others stress that it is rather a “rebalance,” a carefully worded distinction meant to assure Middle East allies that Washington will not abandon its commitments to the Persian Gulf. According to a Congressional Research Report titled, “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia,” the fundamental goal underpinning the shift is to “devote more effort to influencing the development of the Asia-Pacific’s norms and rules, particularly as China emerges as an ever-more influential regional power.” The report by the independent research arm of Congress said that instead of a sudden turn of focus, the shift is “a continuation and expansion of policies already undertaken by previous administrations, as well as earlier in President Obama’s term.”

According to the CRS report, the most dramatic shifts are in the military. The rebalance aims to expand the U.S. presence in the southwestern Pacific and make it “more flexible, more distributed and politically sustainable.” The Obama administration has announced new deployments or rotations of troops and equipment to Australia and Singapore, as well as the increased number of Navy ships deployed forwardly to rest of Western Pacific.

The Navy’s Pacific Fleet Commander, Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, described the shift as more than just an increase of ship deployment to the region.

“The rebalance has been and it continues to be about strengthening relationships, adjusting our military posture and presence, employing new concepts, capabilities and capacities to ensure that we continue to effectively and efficiently contribute to the stability and security of the Asia Pacific as we protect U.S. national interest.” Locklear said in remarks last December at the Pentagon.

Details about the shift are contained in a Pentagon-commissioned report by the Center for Strategic and Independent Studies (CSIS), titled “US Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment.’’

Among the key points: “Consolidating US bases, troops and military assets in Japan and South Korea; building up US forces on Guam and Northern Mariana Islands, strategically located in the Western Pacific; stationing in Singapore littoral combat ships—relatively small, fast, flexible warships capable of intelligence gathering, special operations and landing troops with armored vehicles; and making greater use of Australian naval and air bases and positioning 2,500 Marines in the northern city of Darwin.”

The Pentagon’s latest Defense Strategic Guidance report, in January 2012, said the U.S. is also trying to strengthen its military to military relationships in the region. It is considering establishing a joint military center in Thailand to increase cooperation and respond to regional natural disasters, and re-opening old naval and air bases in Vietnam and the Philippines for greater access for ship and aircraft repair and resupply. U.S. officials say the increased U.S. military presence will boost security capacity of key “partner states” through more flexible security assistance mechanisms and through cooperative counter-terrorism, counter-drug, and counter-insurgency operations.

Despite talks over the potential conflicts with China in the Pacific, Locklear and other Navy officials said the U.S. and Chinese militaries have a responsibility to maintain a good dialogue and a good relationship, stressing the rebalance is “based on a strategy of collaboration and cooperation, not containment, and that the United States is a Pacific power that will remain a Pacific power.” Xi Jinping, China’s newly appointed president, said during his visit to the U.S. in February 2012 that “the Pacific is large enough to host the two powers.”

The longtime local resident hopes the ships will bring a return to “good jobs, good pay, great work ethics and business opportunities everywhere.”

But he and other residents also hope the bulked-up American naval presence will ensure peace in the hotly South China Sea with its rich energy resources.

The steady increase in U.S. Navy ship visits accompanied by joint military exercises hosted in the area signal a major shift in resources as the United States winds down wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and aims to secure its national security interests in the Pacific.

In Subic Bay, on the west coast of the Philippines’ largest island, the U.S. military is trying to protect a vast store of largely untapped energy reserves from being monopolized by China or any other country. National security and energy experts say that though the South China Sea is not a significant energy exporting region fore the U.S., it has vital strategic importance for America’s energy security, especially the freedom of energy shipping routes.

Tensions in the South China Sea

The South China Sea is the site of frequent territorial disputes as nations battle for the oil and gas resources hidden beneath its calm waters.

Backed by a stronger military and a more confident regime, CNOOC – China’s third largest national oil company – is aggressively claiming exploration rights in the South China Sea, some of which are also claimed by neighboring countries.

According to a report from the RAND Corporation, China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Seas pose a potential military threat to the U.S. and its allies, who have a big stake in maintaining open sea lanes to receive a continuous flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

Asia’s rapid economic growth, driven primarily by the region’s leading emerging economies like India and China, is creating a surge in demand for energy resources. A report released by the National Bureau of Asian Research in September called Asia “ground zero” for growth in global energy and commodity markets, indicating that the region will account for more than 85 percent of the world’s increase in demand for oil over the next 20 years.

Almost all claimants of the South China Sea depend heavily on imported oil due to lack of domestic production capacity, and the unstable oil-producing regimes in the Persian Gulf have forced them to look elsewhere for future supplies.

The South China Sea, stretching from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Taiwan, is a perfect alternative. Energy experts in the region say it contains rich hydrocarbons, especially oil and natural gas. While natural gas may be the most abundant resource in the South China Sea, the oil reserves are estimated as high as 213 billion barrels, equivalent of about 80 percent of those of the Saudi Arabia.

Countries in the region such as China, Vietnam and the Philippines are competitively bidding for exploration rights, but most of their national oil companies lack necessary drilling capacities to reach the deep-sea reserves.

But where there is opportunity, there is also conflict. Ever since the 1970s, when oil and gas reserves were first discovered, the South China Sea has been a simmering point of contention. And in recent years, it has erupted into a full-fledged conflict.

Neighboring countries including China, Vietnam and the Philippines have laid claim to these waters and their resources. Within the area, the Spratly and Paracel islands are among the most disputed spots, leading to major armed clashes in recent decades that show no signs of stopping. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that as Asia’s demand for oil continues to rise rapidly, these conflicts will intensify.

The conflicts provide a complicated challenge to the United States, a Pacific power for 70 years. While many allies and partners are relying on the U.S. to protect their rights to explore the oil and gas, America also has an interest in maintaining regional stability and freedom of navigation without directly antagonizing China. Complicating matters are the facts that there is no collective code of conduct and that China claims the entire South China Sea based on its historic records.

Meanwhile China is increasing its military spending, modernizing its Navy and acquiring advanced maritime capabilities. In recent years, China has developed new strategies including plans to expand its naval presence to the Indian Ocean, an area where U.S. Navy currently dominates.

Historically, China’s military priority has been defending territorial rights with a special focus on Taiwan. However, the Pentagon said its investment in platforms such as nuclear-powered submarines and its first aircraft carrier suggest China seeking to support additional military missions beyond its borders.

America’s Pivot to the Pacific, and a potential Dragon-Eagle fight

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Blessed by its sheltered harbor and proximity to major shipping routes, the Philippine’s Subic Bay is key to regional economic activities and energy security. David Kashi/MNSJI

In his trip to Australia in November 2011, President Barack Obama announced a major new security initiative aimed at shifting the focus of U.S. attention—military and otherwise—to the Asia-Pacific region.

“As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority,” Obama said in a speech before the Australian parliament.

“The United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region (Asia-Pacific) and its future.”

The so-called “Asia pivot’” aims to promote U.S. interests by helping to shape the norms and rules among regional players so no single country poses a threat to the stability and freedom of navigation, and to ensure that international laws are respected and that no country is under the coercion of another, said Thomas Donilon, Obama’s national security adviser, in a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Nov. 15, 2012.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said 60 percent of U.S. naval assets will be based in the Pacific by 2020 – a historic high. That includes a net increase of one aircraft carrier, four destroyers, three Zumwalt destroyers, 10t littoral combat ships and two submarines. That, Panetta said at last June’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, “will provide our forces with freedom of maneuver in areas in which our access and freedom of action may be threatened.”

Already, the Pentagon has announced new Marine rotational deployments to Australia, new littoral combat ships, and the possibility of closer military cooperation with the Philippines.

“I think our interest is purely driven by our economic security,” said retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Richard Zilmer, “and we must have a strong economy in order to have a strong national security posture.” Zilmer said the “Asia Pivot” can help by securing regional sea lanes for oil and commerce.

Freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific is also a big concern for China. According to the Pentagon, in 2010 more than 80 percent of China’s oil imports transited the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.

“The sheer volume of oil and liquefied natural gas imports to China from the Middle East will make strategic sea lines of communication increasingly important to Beijing,” the Pentagon said in its annual report to Congress in 2011.

With China already importing 60 percent of its oil and gas and predicted to import almost 75 percent by 2030, Liu Feng, a research fellow at China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies, said access to reserves in the South China Sea is crucial in fueling the country’s rapid growth in the next 50 years.

“America thinks that with its intervention, the current power imbalance between China and the rest can be resolved,” Liu said, “Instead, it will only make the situation worse.”

Although the U.S. has downplayed potential conflicts with China in the region, many see a rivalry inevitable between the world’s only superpower and an emerging power. Some analysts and military officials in Beijing call the shifting American military posture a clear threat to China’s internal affairs and territorial sovereignty.

“China now faces a whole pack of aggressive neighbors headed by Vietnam and the Philippines and also a set of menacing challengers headed by the United States, forming their encirclement (a military term describing a situation when a force is surrounded by enemies) from outside the region,” wrote Xu Zhirong, a deputy chief captain with China Marine Surveillance, in the June-2012 edition of China Eye, a publication of the Hong Kong-based China Energy Fund Committee.

“And, such a band of eager lackeys is exactly what the U.S. needs for its strategic return to Asia,” he wrote.

An increase in U.S. military activities

Vizcocho, a local newspaper publisher who used to work for the U.S. Navy, said that he has seen lots of military activity around the Freeport Zone and nearby air station across the harbor lately, and that the tempo is picking up fast.

Subic Bay has been a major strategic site for U.S. Navy’s logistical support and repair facilities since World War II, but the base was forced to close in 1992 due to rising Philippine nationalism and the eruption of the nearby Mt. Pinatubo volcano. The Subic Bay Freeport Zone, a massive hub of $8.8 billion in foreign investments, more than 90,000 jobs and some 1,500 businesses now is a key regional gateway.

Located in the Western Pacific near important water crossroad Strait of Malacca, Subic Bay usually serves as the place for U.S. logistics ships to repair and refuel. When U.S. aircraft carriers move between bases on the U.S. West Coast, and the Persian Gulf, they sometimes visit Subic Bay or nearby Manila Bay, which has larger capacity.

On Oct. 5, 2012, thousands of sailors and U.S. marines aboard amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard arrived in Subic Bay just days before the annual U.S.-Philippines amphibious landing exercise, in which U.S. and Philippine marines had a combined training with the Armed Forces of the Philippines focusing on humanitarian assistance and natural disaster response drills.

Three weeks later, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington visited Manila Bay for a five-day goodwill visit.. On Nov. 26, the Charles Drew pulled into Subic Bay for a two-day stop.

Future: rotational places, not permanent bases

American forces are indeed coming back, but in a different fashion this time. In the future, the Pentagon will add rotation deployments to Asia Pacific instead of having long-tern installations. Both Air Force and Navy are looking at increased presence in northern Australia, while the Marine Corps is planning to deploy 2,500 troops on a rotational training basis. Pentagon officials say, in the future, U.S. may use Subic Bay for port visits instead of long-term bases.

U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert explained last November at an event in Washington DC, the Navy will have rotational deployments to the Asia-Pacific region, rather than permanent bases. The U.S. is in talks with allies and partners that will allow US forces to access places in the region so it can continue to operate there and remain a Pacific power.

“Additional bases in the Pacific are not being sought by the U.S., but the Philippines has offered increased port visits to Subic Bay,” said Bernard Cole, a retired U.S. Navy captain who teaches at the National War College. Cole expected more Navy visits and the possible establishment of a repair facility manned by civilians.
U.S. officials are now in talks with Philippine defense and diplomatic officials to increase the frequency of joint military exercises, ship and aircraft visits and other types of cooperation. Panetta’s visit to the naval and air base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam in early June opened the talks about allowing the U.S. Navy to reuse the country’s deep-water port.

Local voice: U.S. comeback is necessary

Twenty years ago, as a result of surging nationalism, lawmakers in the Philippines Senate voted to terminate the lease on U.S. military bases in the country.

Today, many see the U.S. rebalance to the region as a positive move. For local Filipinos in Subic Bay, the comeback of U.S. and its military presence means more economic opportunities.

But more importantly, it brings a sense of security.

“It’s only right to maintain a balance of power,” said Edgar G. Geniza, president of Mondriaan Aura College in the Freeport Zone. “The U.S. presence will remind big countries to go slow and not forget about the responsibilities to their fellows.”

“Personally, I think it’s better for us. We feel a little more secure when Americans are around,” Geniza added. “We realize we are not as strong as some other powers in the region. In terms of our Air Force, we have more air than force.”

Added Renato De Castro, an international studies professor at De La Salle University in Manila, “We are faced with what we perceive as China growing more powerful, more assertive, [so] we simply have no choice but to rely on the offshore balancing role of the United States. This is a situation that we don’t like, but have to do, simply because we are faced with an emergent and certainly confident great power.”

Olongapo City Mayor James “Bong” Gordon, a strong supporter of more U.S. military presence, has been to countries like Singapore and Guam to lobby for stronger regional alliances with the U.S. He linked the region’s economic security to national security.

“We want a secured region,” said Gordon, “To secure the region, we want to host our military allies. We need the U.S. military to be the deterrent for the Southeast Asia region, and to patrol the waters. The Philippines cannot do it alone.”