BY KELLY GUSTAFSON
One of the central achievements of the NATO summit in Chicago in May was a timetable for transitioning troops out of Afghanistan, but President Obama and other leaders failed to address—at least publicly—how the transition might work without Pakistan’s cooperation.
Relations with Afghanistan’s neighbor have been sour since a United States-authorized drone strike on the country’s border in November accidentally killed two dozen Pakistani soldiers. Tensions have only escalated in recent months after Pakistan shut down NATO supply lines to Afghanistan following the strike.
Pakistan played what it thought was a trump card by shutting down the supply lines, but the fallout was not the disaster that it could have been, said Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation.
“This is no longer a source of leverage they hold over the United States,” Curtis said.
Though trekking vehicles and weapons through Pakistan is the easiest way to get supplies to NATO troops in Afghanistan, the United States has tapped into other, albeit circuitous, routes through central Asian states and Russia.
Now is there a way to “get around” Pakistan if it is unwilling to help a smooth transition out of Afghanistan?
“The question isn’t really about getting around Pakistan as it is so much about getting Pakistan to support the U.S. goals,” said Curtis.
One of NATO’s top goals has been to eradicate terrorists seeking sanctuary in Pakistan who would undermine the alliance’s hard-won efforts.
The Obama administration came in with a strategy of engagement toward Pakistan, but the trust between the two countries has only deteriorated.
“I think that we could see a better relationship so long as Pakistan decides it’s in their interest to crackdown on these groups that are targeting the U.S.,” Curtis said referring to the terrorist groups seeking safe haven in Pakistan.
“Unless Pakistan uses its influences with the Taliban to bring them to compromise, then I think it’s difficult to see how we can fully repair the relationship.”
Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid said Pakistan’s biggest conundrum is its foreign policy. He said Pakistan’s foreign goals have dominated its domestic policy for too long, and Pakistan needs to realize the importance of making friends with its neighbors.
“Maybe things will get much worse before they get better,” Rashid said during a Chicago Council on Global Affairs conference prior to the summit.
Some experts, like Curtis, doubt Pakistan’s willingness to cooperate and help establish lasting peace in Afghanistan. Others say a longterm peaceful Afghanistan isn’t possible, regardless of Pakistan’s regional cooperation.
For the Obama administration to say the guarantees of the Pakistani government—if negotiated— could secure Afghanistan post-2014 would be “foolhardy”, said Gordon Adams, an international relations professor at American University.
“We’re leaving behind an economy in shambles, a country awash in trafficking in poppies and heroin and a thoroughly corrupt Afghan regime,” Adams said. “The corruption of the government alone is enough to make the country unstable, whether the Pakistanis play ball or not.”
But pushing back the proposed pullout date would only worsen things, he said, completely against the notion of “the longer we stay, the better things get.”
“I don’t know if it’s optimistic or pessimistic, but I think it’s realistic. We are not going to make this happen,” Adams said of the successful transition as outlined by NATO leaders.
Part of the problem Western countries face when trying to broker deals with Islamabad is the country’s own instability.
“To assume that they’re going to be able to help establish peace in Afghanistan when they can’t even restore order in the northwest territories and federally administered tribal areas is just a bridge too far,” Adams said.
