Paper is the future for election security
WASHINGTON — As states attempt to improve election security for the 2020 presidential election after the attempted foreign interference in the election of 2016, paper ballots are becoming increasingly popular.
Only 12 states use purely digital voting systems in some polling stations and at least six of those states have taken action to replace those systems.
There is a growing academic and expert consensus that paper ballots, whether hand-marked or created with a ballot-marking device, are the safest way to secure elections.
“To trust the computers without some kind of software-independent check, which right now only means paper, is to risk either not catching some kind of malware or other problem that could alter results or the potential to not being able to recover from an attack or mistake that has altered the counts,” said Lawrence Norden, deputy director of the Brennan Center’s Democracy Program. Norden co-authored a report on election security for the policy institute earlier this month.
However, there is still disagreement over whether ballot-marking devices should be used or are the safest method. Juan Gilbert, a computer science researcher at the University of Florida, says ballot-marking devices are better than hand-marking ballots.
“When people have the ability to mark a ballot, they mark it with what they feel their intent means,” Gilbert said. “Sometimes, that doesn’t translate into the scanner or to a bipartisan group that reviews it afterwards.”
Gilbert said a ballot-marking device is no less secure than a hand-marking system, since both scenarios require the use of a scanner, which is vulnerable to hacking. Gilbert says hacking a ballot-marking device would not be a major concern.
“A ballot-marking device, when used effectively, is nothing more than a sophisticated ink pen,” Gilbert said.
The Georgia legislature recently sent a bill to Republican Gov. Brian Kemp’ that would, among other adjustments to the voting process, require all electronic voting machines to print a paper read-out of each voter’s choices, which could be used in audit or recount. The voter is allowed to look over the printed ballot before handing it in. This method is used in 24 states.
Kemp was the victor of the hotly contested 2018 Georgia gubernatorial race. Opponent Stacey Abrams alleges that Kemp, the then-secretary of state, abused his role to suppress voter turnout, especially that of African-Americans.
The bill’s proponents say the touch-screen and paper combination has clear advantages over a purely paper ballot.
“Touch-screen ballot markers leave absolute no room for doubt of voter intent since voters make a clear choice with the touch of a button,” said Georgia State Sen. William Ligon, a Republican who championed the bill ,in a statement. “Reverting back to any other form of voting system, including pencil marks on paper ballots, could easily force our state into a ‘hanging chad’ situation that Florida experienced in the 2000 election.”
But Georgia Democrats are unconvinced and want a simple paper ballot.
“First, touchscreen machines are actually not more accurate than hand-marking a ballot, and secondly, ballot-marking devices cannot produce meaningful audits,” said State Rep. Jasmine Clark, a Democrat, during debate on the bill in February.
The debate over paper ballots has entered the national conversation as well. Democratic presidential candidate Sen.Kamala Harris, D-Calif., has encouraged states to switch to paper ballots and repeatedly said, “Russia can’t hack a piece of paper.”
There is no evidence that Russia tampered with ballots in any U.S. election. However, according the Department of Homeland Security, hackers have attempted to break into election systems over 100 times since fall 2018.
But the method of conducting elections is not the only factor to consider when determining the risk of interference. States that use old equipment, with parts that are no longer manufactured, also face a unique risk.
“That often means that election officials, to keep the machines running, if they don’t have money to replace them, need to purchase replacement parts,” said Norden. “Often, we’re hearing from them that they’re going to eBay to do that.”
Election officials don’t know if the parts they get on eBay are coming from a trusted source, which means the parts could have been tampered with.
Conducting a post-election audit of a portion of the ballots before the certification of the election results is an important way to ensure systems are working properly. States conduct audits in vastly different ways, some not until after the results have been certified. But audits record paper records.
“From my perspective, the gold standard in elections is the ability to audit,” Gilbert said.