The odd little word “hegemony” was absent during two recent and heavily publicized meetings between the U.S. and China, but that’s only because the leaders were trying to make nice.
Military and economic relations almost inevitably will become more strained in the future, so expect to hear “hegemony” again and again from diplomats and commentators; a word that is always meant in its darkest, most accusatory, sense.
The most common synonym is “dominance,” as in one state being dominant over others. And in the tug-of-war between the U.S. and an ascending China, it represents power, at least perceived power.
The recent visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to the White House was, as all state visits are, carefully choreographed to display agreements, not the bubbling tensions that were, nonetheless, hard to miss.
President Obama, President Hu Jintao and Army Col. David P. Anders at the White House, Jan. 19, 2011. (US Army photo)
President Obama provided Hu with all the charm and elegance of an official visit—something the Chinese had been denied during the Bush administration. But a State Dinner and sweet talk could not disguise the disagreements over economic and monetary policy, anger at China’s stubborn support of North Korea, and a general sense that China is eagerly on the road to replacing America as a dominant power regionally in Asia and in global economics.
For decades during the Cold War, the Chinese complained about U.S. hegemonic interests in military, economic and cultural fields. Now the U.S. worries that the Chinese want to supplant American authority in a desire for more political power and natural resources, especially in Latin America, Africa and throughout southeast Asia.
It is a legitimate worry.
“Hegemony” is derived from the Greek word for leader or leadership. In the most recent (2008) edition of Safire’s Political Dictionary, the word is considered “laudable” when applied to an individual, but “predatory” when talking about a nation.
That’s precisely how it’s been used, whether referring to the Prussians of the 1860s or to America’s control over Central America a hundred years ago. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, at least one American intellectual, Noam Chomsky, extrapolated that experience to a book-length accusation, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance.
Americans tend to think of U.S. policy as generally benign. But that isn’t the case if you are in the way of a powerful nation’s interests.
Safire’s dictionary also notes that the French referred to the U.S. “manipulation of the world’s currency markets” as recently as 1993, a complaint that the Obama administration echoes now about China.
Though he lived in a far different China, one that still had vivid memories of Japan’s attacks and takeover of Chinese lands during World War II, Chairman Mao Zedong, that old guerrilla leader, famously exhorted his people to “dig deep tunnels, store grain everywhere and never seek hegemony.” That last bit may have been a cunning reference to the break in relations with the Soviet Union, but Mao, Deng Xiaoping and their successors have repeated the caution against hegemony in every decade since.
During most of that time, the U.S. considered China an inward-looking country that was not competitive and had little interest in political dominance outside its borders. Yes, it supported the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese against the U.S. and other nations, and it wanted to be considered a leader of a Third World bloc of nations that included not only African and Middle East countries but the other sleeping giant, India.
But the Chinese were mostly concerned about internal stability (still the most critical interest among Communist Party leaders, of which Hu is the leader) and the pressure of a population rapidly expanding past one billion people created its own priorities.
In the last 30 years, however, the success of Chinese trade to the U.S. and around the world—and the need to satisfy the growing expectations of its 1.3 billion citizens—is fueling a more ambitious outreach.
Several years ago, for instance, China was the first nation to sign a broad agreement on mineral rights with Chile; it has negotiated for huge tracts of teak and other forests in southeast Asia; an estimated six to seven percent of its oil comes from Sudan, only one of many African nations where the Chinese are building roads and infrastructure in exchange for shares of natural resources.
Some in Congress and in the American media wanted to confront Hu about human rights abuses in China, though he so clearly was not interested in discussing that subject. His goal, including an overnight visit to Chicago to speak with business and trade leaders, was meant to cement those relations and calm U.S. fears of a more obvious rivalry. China is patient as it gears up its worldwide influence.
American recognition of China’s ambitions were not lessened prior to Hu’s Washington visit during the Beijing meetings of Defense Secretary Robert Gates, whose trip coincided, to everyone’s surprise, with the first test flight of a new Chinese stealth fighter plane.
When the language of the two nations begins with cross accusations of “hegemony,” we all will know that China feels confident enough to act and react like a superpower and relations with the West and with America in particular will be familiar to those who still remember the Cold War.It’s hard to argue that a stealth plane is a defensive weapon. Despite all assurances that it was just a coincidence, American analysts believed it was either a sign that the Chinese military have independent control from Beijing’s political leadership, or that it was a very deliberate message to the U.S. that China is no longer so inward looking.
There is a danger in overstating the tension of this relationship. With commentators talking about the “Chinese Century” replacing the last “American Century,” they conjure up images of an imperial reach exerted throughout history by other powers, Roman, Ottoman, British and, of course, American.
In the foreseeable future, there is no question of U.S. dominance in the military arena. But China’s insistence on extending its territorial waters and its irritation whenever the U.S. conducts joint exercises with Korea and Japan are factors that could have further economic consequences. The U.S. ought not dismiss those Chinese concerns; it involves more than pride.
China’s serious objection to continuing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, for instance, could lead to military conflict if any Taiwanese leader promoted formal separation from the mainland; it is a matter of national destiny to the Chinese and we would be foolhardy to dismiss it as anything less.
The exercise of power is both shifting and dynamic: For some years, American influence appeared waning in the capitals of southeast Asia, but that may be reversing now because of China showing new muscle in foreign affairs.
At the same time, for countries in Africa, the Middle East and in other developing areas, a more robust China may be just the counterweight they have wanted to help balance America’s post-Cold War dominance.
When the language of the two nations begins with cross accusations of “hegemony,” we all will know that China feels confident enough to act and react like a superpower and relations with the West and with America in particular will be familiar to those who still remember the Cold War.
