WASHINGTON – Former White House staffer Michael Allen evaluated the effectiveness of the institutions for gathering U.S. intelligence created since 9/11 recently. His analysis: The government tried to create a balance between protecting citizens privacy and collecting intelligence to prevent terrorism, but possibly should have moved more slowly.
The 9/11 Commission concluded that national security structure created after World War II “no longer suited the post 9/11 era,” said Allen, who was a national security staffer for the Bush administration and the House Select Permanent Committee on Intelligence.
“The 9/11 Commission decided that they needed a new spymaster and a new agile system that could move money and people very quickly to meet new threats and these functions needed to be separated from the CIA,” said Allen.
Congress then passed the intelligence Reform and Prevention Act, creating Office of the Director of National Intelligence and a National Counterterrorism Center.
“Over the course of four and a half months, they developed the most sweeping restructuring of the intelligence community since 1947,” said Allen. However, he would have preferred a slower, more “deliberative process,” if he could go back to 2004.
When they were developing the legislation, “we were under tremendous pressure,” in the midst of the 2004 presidential election and 9/11 Commission lobbying, said Allen.
Elbridge Colby, a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, agreed with Allen’s assessment. In a telephone interview, he said that it would have been better for Congress and the Bush administration to have had a more deliberate and slower process.
“The process was accelerated by the 9/11 Commission and some of the recommendations were not ideal,” said Colby.
“I think it would have made more sense for the Director of National Intelligence to have more authority. he has a lot of responsibility, but not enough executive authority,” said Colby.
As Allen put it, “When we try to legislate in anger or because political pressure,” problems will arise. He applied that lesson to recent revelations by former government contractor Edward Snowden who exposed the National Security Agency collection and storage of Americans’ telephone metadata.
Allen’s new book, “Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11,” attempts to be the authoritative history of the intelligence reform act of 2004, which was created to address these intelligence failures, said Allen.
When the law was first implemented there were three schools of opposition to the 9/11 Commission recommendations, which helps explain some of the problems the country is facing today, said Allen.
Allen said that the first most prominent camp of opposition was the defense camp, which was primarily led by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who was adamantly opposed to the recommendations because he thought any rebalancing of power would lead to less control of people and money for the Pentagon. He told President Bush to act with “caution.”
Allen said the second camp of opposition, led by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and CIA Director Michael Hayden, thought the new system would have less bureaucracy power and advocated for the CIA to lead the intelligence community.
The third view was held by Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who thought the plan would create more bureaucracy, which would result in less authority for the military, said Allen.
Despite the initial opposition, the reforms have ultimately been successful, Allen said. His evidence: the U.S. has not been hit with another terrorist attack of the same magnitude since 9/11.
