Tag Archives: COIN

Aid workers pay high price for USAID policy in Afghanistan

WASHINGTON –Security for aid workers in Afghanistan is deteriorating and nongovernment organizations blame U.S. development policies for putting more lives at risk.

The U.S. Agency for International Development requires that humanitarian aid projects in Afghanistan support the military’s war strategy, a policy that has made aid workers targets for the Taliban, nongovernment organizations say.

“There are more attacks on aid workers now,” said Ann Richard, vice president of government relations at the International Rescue Committee, a nongovernment organization with programs in Afghanistan. “Security for NGOs has gone in the opposite direction.”

USAID policies explicitly support the counterinsurgency war strategy in Afghanistan, and the agency allocates funding to nongovernment organizations based on how their projects “contribute to COIN goals,” according to agency guidelines. COIN is shorthand for counterinsurgency, the war strategy used in the Iraq and Afghanistan that coordinates military force with development and peacekeeping efforts to defeat insurgent groups.

USAID grants require aid organizations work closely with the military on projects such as “battlefield clean up,” where aid workers are sent to clean up post-conflict damage in communities where there was heavy fighting, Richard said.

Merging nongovernment aid projects with military operations has tarnished the apolitical, impartial image critical to the safety of aid workers, many organizations say. The general assumption among Afghans is that aid organizations are working for the U.S. military, said one aid worker who helps run medical programs for an organization that has worked in Afghanistan for more than 15 years.

“If there’s anger at the military, then often times the NGOs will have to pay for it,” said the aid worker, who asked not to be named for fear he might jeopardize the organization’s programs.

Three aid workers were killed in July when suicide bombers attacked the compound of Development Alternatives, a consulting group that helps implements USAID development projects in Afghanistan. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, which officials said was a response to the recent surge of U.S. troops.

“Even the perception of being tied to the military can have tragic results,” said Brian Katulis, a national security expert at Center for American Progress and a former State Department official.

Development aid has been tied to counterinsurgency since the war strategy was implemented in Iraq during the Bush administration, but only recently have nonprofits started to collectively push back. The Obama administration has ratcheted up aid efforts in Afghanistan, where the need for infrastructure and humanitarian aid far exceeds that in Iraq.

Safety concerns are paramount in Afghanistan, where insurgents are killing civilians at a rate three times higher than they did during the Iraq war, according to a paper released in July by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The Taliban’s murder of 10 members of Christian organization International Assistance Mission on Aug. 5 has escalated fears among aid workers.

“It’s not a good situation,” said Beth Cole, director of intergovernmental affairs at the U.S. Institution of Peace. “The Taliban are circling Kabul. The days are waning.”

Since the start of 2010, there have been 76 attacks on nongovernment workers in Afghanistan, according to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, an independent group that provides security information for humanitarian workers in the country. Fifteen of those incidents, which include violent attacks and abduction, occurred in July.

Several nongovernment organizations working in Afghanistan have stopped applying for USAID funding and are instead seeking more funding from private donors and the EU, aid workers reported. Still, many organizations say they cannot regain the trust they worked to earn in Afghan communities since long before the 2001 U.S. invasion.

Some argue that aid workers’ blame is misplaced. Because of the increased threat from insurgent groups, development organizations have to learn to work closer with the military, said Richard Owens, director for community stabilization at International Relief and Development.

“You cannot rely on your good relationship with the local communicates to keep you safe anymore,” said Owens, who has a background in coordinating military-civilian operations. “In a world where the Taliban exists, all bets are off.”

Nonprofits are “naive” to think association with the military puts them at greater risk, said Andrew Natsios, a professor of diplomacy at Georgetown University and USAID administrator from 2001 to 2006. The Taliban target aid organizations because they are bringing development to Afghanistan, Natsios said.

“Whatever is not 12th century in their world view is regarded as the enemy,” Natsios said. “What the Taliban is fighting against is modernization.”

According to media reports, the Taliban killed the Christian aid workers earlier this month because they were “spying” for the U.S. and “preaching Christianity.” The international group included Afghan nationals and had worked in the country for more than 30 years.

A senior adviser at one high-profile aid organization working in Afghanistan said his organization had been doing development work in Taliban-controlled areas because aid workers spent years proving to insurgents that they did not have a political mission. The organization is rethinking where they can send workers and type of projects they can do under increased security threats.

Development efforts have shifted to areas in Afghanistan where U.S. military forces are concentrated. Health programs in other areas of the country have been shut down, replaced by new projects in the south and east, where fighting is the heaviest, said Leonard Rubenstein, a public health professor at Johns Hopkins and former U.S. Institute of Peace fellow.

The inequitable distribution of aid runs contrary to nonprofit development practices that stress equitable resources across ethnic groups and has created animosity among some communities “who feel they are being penalized for being peaceful,” according to research by Andrew Wilder, an expert on governance and aid in Afghanistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Some nongovernment organizations fear communities that have lost development projects may lash out at aid workers, creating new conflict in previously stable areas.

“It’s actually counterproductive,” Rubenstein said. “You’re really shooting yourself in the foot.”

Will COIN in Afghanistan ever work?

Sen. Jim Webb’s recent comments about his concerns about the U.S. role in Afghanistan didn’t make any headlines, but the Obama administration — and the many reporters who cover it—would do well to play close attention to them.

Webb, D-Va., said during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that, in drawing up its congressionally mandated December report, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, “the administration must provide us some clarity, not only as to specific programs, but as to what their policies are expected to accomplish in a larger sense.”

“The argument that we are in Afghanistan because of 9/11 is true only in the sense that the presence of international terrorists inside Afghanistan at that time illuminated the overall threat,” said Webb. “International terrorism is by its very nature mobile, with the capability to operate in many areas, as we know well.”

In other words, Webb said, if the United States is in Afghanistan to counter the global threat posed by al-Qaida and affiliated militants, it needs to do a better job of explaining how it hopes to accomplish that by surging tens of thousands of additional American troops into the country and asking them to do counter-insurgency—especially when al-Qaida’s command has moved to neighboring Pakistan.

Although counterinsurgency, or COIN, has become all the rage within the Obama administration, a growing number of military experts are quietly saying that it could easily draw the United States into a protracted and debilitating (and extraordinarily expensive) war that essentially cannot be won.

The reason: The COIN strategy means that the U.S. military, and its allies in ISAF, are waging war in order to eliminate—or at least diminish—the legitimacy of the Taliban insurgency in alliance with a U.S.-backed government in Kabul that is, at best, a reluctant partner. For that effort to succeed, U.S. forces must also convince the Afghan population to support the Karzai government, even as the already unpopular regime grows even more unpopular with each revelation of corruption—and each public increase in U.S. support.

In his explosive Rolling Stone article last month that resulted in Obama firing his Afghanistan war commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, freelance journalist Michael Hastings captured some very telling conversations between the general and soldiers that he was visiting on the front lines of the counterinsurgency effort. One of them tells McChrystal that some of the men believed the U.S. is not only losing the war, but that the troops don’t even know why they’re there.

In the piece, Hastings reports that McChrystal defended his counterinsurgency strategy but that the troops remained highly skeptical. Moreover, Hastings quotes McChrystal’s own chief of operations as saying that the U.S. COIN effort in Afghanistan is, essentially, doomed.

“It’s not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win,” Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, McChrystal’s chief of operations, is quoted as saying. “This is going to end in an argument.”

Although Webb’s comments were more measured, they carry a lot of clout. Besides being a decorated Marine Corps veteran and former secretary of the Navy, he has in relatively short order become one of the more influential congressional Democrats on the issue. He serves on both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees in the Senate.

“In its December review, it is important for the Administration to clearly show how the process it is putting into place in Afghanistan will degrade or defeat the threat of international terrorism,” Webb said at the hearing. “This can only be done by demonstrating: (1) measurable results, (2) evidence of political stability; and (3) an agreed upon conclusion to the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.”