Tag Archives: Afghanistan

On WikiLeaks and Pakistan

Some Obama administration officials and congressional lawmakers in recent days
 have sought to downplay the significance of the massive leak of secret U.S.
military files by the organization WikiLeaks by saying it’s “old news,’’ or a 
rehash of what is already well known about the prolonged war.
 But why would they think such a dismissive characterization of the remarkable 
trove of documents makes things better, not worse?

If anything, what they are conceding is that top U.S. intelligence and 
policy-making officials know full well that at least some of the billions of dollars that they have given to Pakistan in recent years has gone to funding the very insurgency that they are trying to wipe out in Afghanistan – with little, if
 any success.

It’s true that Washington has long known that Pakistan has been playing such a
 double game, especially its powerful Inter-Services Intelligence directorate. The 
ISI essentially created the militant groups that became the Taliban to act as
their proxy fighting forces against India and, later, in Afghanistan. 
But the front-line troop reports and other documents posted online by WikiLeaks
 provide chilling and authoritative details about how U.S.-funded allied forces are
 literally at war with our own troops.

And they do so with the kind of specificity 
that the Obama administration and congressional lawmakers will find hard to 
ignore.
 The really smart counterterrorism officials in Washington – who don’t dare speak 
publicly because it could end their careers – are hoping the new disclosures will 
finally force those in charge of Pakistan policy to do something that they
 have been unwilling to do in the past.
 They’re hoping the White House and Congress tie the billions in aid money flowing 
to Pakistan to verifiable efforts by the Islamabad government to slash the ties
 between its intelligence and military services and the Taliban and other militant
 organizations that they are in collusion with.

Speaking on the condition of anonymity, some of them acknowledge that such
 “tough love’’ could be risky. When Washington cut off some aid to Pakistan after 
it clandestinely developed nuclear weapons capability, the Islamabad government 
intensified its ties to jihadi organizations. 
But given the intensity of the Taliban insurgency, they say, that is a risk that 
Washington can’t afford not to take.

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A whole different kind of AWOL

The 17 Afghan men ­stare ­out from the black and white mug shots of a military-issued memo.

The Be-On-the-Look-Out bulletin, or BOLO­, is the modern-day equivalent of a “WANTED” poster, ­shared between different ­federal agencies to help track down fugitives or missing persons within the United States.

These 17 faces are not those of terrorists, according to the U.S. government. They are missing Afghani military members, and, the moment they walked off base where they were training, they became illegal immigrants. And wanted men.

Since it was first reported ­by FOX ­News a few ­weeks ago, the BOLO, and the news it heralds, has caused a stir among government and military officials, catching the attention of members of Congress.

It was issued by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service to alert military professionals that the men had gone missing from the Defense Language Institute’s campus at Lackland Air Force Base.

At the institute outside San Antonio, Texas, the ­Afghan troops were in the middle of, or in some cases had graduated from, an English language-training program that would allow them to go on to other U.S. military educational facilities, anywhere from dental training school to the War College. At the end of their education, they were supposed to return to Afghanistan, where they would help American and NATO forces fight the insurgency and stabilize the country.

“We are continuing to monitor the situation,” said Capt. John Severns, spokesman for Air Education and Training Command, which runs Lackland Air Force Base. He said once they went missing, though, the Afghan soldiers fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security.

Perhaps the bulletin’s most interesting effect has been to illuminate the murky communications between the tangle of military and government agencies that are handling the issue.

“There are a lot of hands in this,” said one defense official with knowledge of the matter, asking not to be named because his agency did not currently have jurisdiction over the Afghan fugitives.  He suggested a number for the NATO agency called the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, which brought the Afghan men to the U.S. The U.S. number for that agency did not work.

He confirmed that the NCIS bulletin was incomplete and outdated in that it only reported 17 Afghan individuals, when there have been 46 who have gone missing between 2007 and 2009. He said of the 17 named, all but four had been found – many are seeking asylum in Canada. He had no knowledge of what prompted NCIS to issue the bulletin at the time it did.

He and other military officials said they were not concerned that the absences were a threat to security, though. All access privileges are revoked and ID cards inactivated once a person disappears, he said.

At Lackland, Air Force officials can only try to discourage the students who are still there from deserting.

And keeping them under lock and key is out of the question, Severns said.

“They’re students, not prisoners,” he said.

But Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX) has concerns about the security implications of the disappearances. Smith, a ­member of the Homeland Security Committee, has called for the Air Force and Department of Homeland Security to brief Congress on the issue.

“It’s no surprise that individuals who come to the U.S. legally on visas decide to stay illegally. But when those individuals are foreign military officers – with special access to military facilities – it creates a serious national security threat to American communities,” he said in a ­statement.

It is not uncommon for foreign nationals brought to the U.S. by the military for schooling to decide they like it enough to stay against their visas. According to Air Force and Defense officials, it’s been happening for decades, with many just staying under the radar or heading to Canada.

“People jumping ship is pretty common,” said Muzaffar Chista, Director of the Migration Policy Institute at New York University School of Law, speaking generally about the phenomenon in immigration and U.S. history.

He said the Afghan military members were somewhat similar to stowaways, people who stay on board a vessel just long enough to reach a port where they disembark – and then disappear into the crowd.

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How far will the U.S. go to fuel the war in Afghanistan?

WASHINGTON – Some of the characters are new, but the scene in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan is one of déjà vu. This past April’s riots were the second time in five years that the United States was left in the uncomfortable position of watching as a president of the small Central Asian country was ousted amidst allegations that U.S. fuel contracts supplying a major logistical hub for the war in Afghanistan were funneling millions of dollars to Kyrgyzstan’s presidential family.

Even before the most recent overthrow, the House National Security Subcommittee was looking into contracts in the region, which is renowned for its corruption. Now, the subcommittee has undertaken a full-fledged investigation, focused on the contracts at Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan, while the Department of Defense moves to open up bidding on the suspect contracts.

“Let’s be honest: At many times throughout our history, the United States has closely dealt with unsavory regimes in order to achieve more pressing policy or strategic objectives,” Rep. John Tierney, D-Mass., said in his opening remarks at the investigation’s first hearing in April. “The United States will have to work hard to restore our credibility in (the Kyrgyz’­) eyes, beginning with transparency regarding U.S. fuel contracts at Manas.”

The F.B.I. collaborated with the Kyrgyz government on an investigation in 2005, when accusations that the son of then-president Askar Akayev was improperly benefiting from U.S. fuel contracts. That FBI report was never made public, but an independent investigator for the Kyrgyz told The New York Timesthat he suspected the new president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, simply took over the same business model, installing his son, Maksim Bakiyev, as the beneficiary.

Now, the anti-corruption interim government led by Roza Otunbayeva is opening its own investigation, focused on six subcontractors allegedly controlled by Maksim Bakiyev.

“Whatever the Pentagon’s policy of buying warlords in Afghanistan, the state of Kyrgyzstan demands more respect,” Edil Baisalov, chief of staff for the interim lead, told ­The Times in April. “The government of Kyrgyzstan will not be bought and sold. We are above that.”

The closely linked companies at the center of the allegations are Red Star and Mina Corp., which provide enormous amounts of Russian jet fuel to power U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Together, the companies have received more than $1 billion for fuel sales over the past six years.

The fact that companies’ director of operations, Charles “Chuck” Squires, is a retired Army lieutenant colonel and former defense attaché to the U.S. embassy in Bishkek raises some eyebrows. Except in the case where a presidential directive makes an exemption for national security concerns, military contracts are subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the law that outlaws bribery in U.S. business transactions overseas.

“If this were a commercial setting, an investigator would probably start by studying whether there really is an arm’s-length relationship between Red Star and Pentagon contractors,” Scott Horton, an expert on accountability in military contracts, said in his written testimony to the House committee. “If not, an investigator might quickly conclude that it is a shell interposed to provide a buffer between the procurement officers and companies controlled by the president’s family.”

The hearing witnesses consistently hit the refrain that the U.S. embassy delegation was unnecessarily close with the Bakiyev regime. The essential question is whether this was a State Department blunder, or if it was part of a larger policy of currying favor with the regime to ensure the future of the Manas air base.

In February 2009, in what was widely seen as a quid pro quo, Bakiyev announced plans to close the Manas base on the same day that Russian President Putin announced $2.15 billion in aid to the country. Later, Bakiyev flipped when the U.S. agreed to pay $17 million more in annual rent for the base.

Earlier this month, the Department of Defense moved to open up bidding on the contracts to the Manas base. Meanwhile, the United States and Kyrgyzstan have been in intense negotiations over taxes on fuel being imported to the base.

In impoverished Kyrgyzstan, the U.S. air base and its connected contracts make an easy whipping boy for disgruntled citizens whose country was ranked 128 out of 149 for corruption by World Audit in 2009.

But in business environments like that of Kyrgyzstan, it may well be that only countries connected to political elite will be in a position to meet U.S. needs.

“Allegations like these are an inevitable by-product of working in this part of the world, where corruption is just the way business is done,” said Martha Brill Olcott, an expert on the region for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The question is, were these contracts illegal, or were they simply unethical? There are only a few places you can get oil from – you’ve got to have a refinery – and it’s predictable that the bigger companies, the ones with elite connections, are going to be the ones that can get the best deal for the U.S. government.”

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Will COIN in Afghanistan ever work?

Sen. Jim Webb’s recent comments about his concerns about the U.S. role in Afghanistan didn’t make any headlines, but the Obama administration — and the many reporters who cover it—would do well to play close attention to them.

Webb, D-Va., said during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that, in drawing up its congressionally mandated December report, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, “the administration must provide us some clarity, not only as to specific programs, but as to what their policies are expected to accomplish in a larger sense.”

“The argument that we are in Afghanistan because of 9/11 is true only in the sense that the presence of international terrorists inside Afghanistan at that time illuminated the overall threat,” said Webb. “International terrorism is by its very nature mobile, with the capability to operate in many areas, as we know well.”

In other words, Webb said, if the United States is in Afghanistan to counter the global threat posed by al-Qaida and affiliated militants, it needs to do a better job of explaining how it hopes to accomplish that by surging tens of thousands of additional American troops into the country and asking them to do counter-insurgency—especially when al-Qaida’s command has moved to neighboring Pakistan.

Although counterinsurgency, or COIN, has become all the rage within the Obama administration, a growing number of military experts are quietly saying that it could easily draw the United States into a protracted and debilitating (and extraordinarily expensive) war that essentially cannot be won.

The reason: The COIN strategy means that the U.S. military, and its allies in ISAF, are waging war in order to eliminate—or at least diminish—the legitimacy of the Taliban insurgency in alliance with a U.S.-backed government in Kabul that is, at best, a reluctant partner. For that effort to succeed, U.S. forces must also convince the Afghan population to support the Karzai government, even as the already unpopular regime grows even more unpopular with each revelation of corruption—and each public increase in U.S. support.

In his explosive Rolling Stone article last month that resulted in Obama firing his Afghanistan war commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, freelance journalist Michael Hastings captured some very telling conversations between the general and soldiers that he was visiting on the front lines of the counterinsurgency effort. One of them tells McChrystal that some of the men believed the U.S. is not only losing the war, but that the troops don’t even know why they’re there.

In the piece, Hastings reports that McChrystal defended his counterinsurgency strategy but that the troops remained highly skeptical. Moreover, Hastings quotes McChrystal’s own chief of operations as saying that the U.S. COIN effort in Afghanistan is, essentially, doomed.

“It’s not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win,” Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, McChrystal’s chief of operations, is quoted as saying. “This is going to end in an argument.”

Although Webb’s comments were more measured, they carry a lot of clout. Besides being a decorated Marine Corps veteran and former secretary of the Navy, he has in relatively short order become one of the more influential congressional Democrats on the issue. He serves on both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees in the Senate.

“In its December review, it is important for the Administration to clearly show how the process it is putting into place in Afghanistan will degrade or defeat the threat of international terrorism,” Webb said at the hearing. “This can only be done by demonstrating: (1) measurable results, (2) evidence of political stability; and (3) an agreed upon conclusion to the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.”

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Afghan prisons

Last summer, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who was at the time the top commander of American forces in Afghanistan, identified one of the biggest problems in Afghanistan: The prison population. “There are more insurgents per square foot in corrections facilities than anywhere else in Afghanistan,” he wrote in an August 2009 report that was addressed to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates. It was a chilling assessment – and yet should not have been surprising.

For years, the U.S.-run prison at Bagram had been reviled and feared, and at least two detainees died while being held there. Detainees were until recently “housed in primitive pens made from cages surrounded by razor wire,” says Jonathan Horowitz, a researcher who has visited the place and whose work is supported by Open Society Institute. The prison now has a new name, Detention Facility in Parwan, and detainees are given brightly lit rooms, neatly pressed sheets on their beds and prayer blankets. On a broader scale, Americans are trying to make the detention system more transparent, creating a FaceBook page to showcase work, and they are planning to turn the system over to the Afghans in the next year or so.

The military recently invited journalists to a trial at Parwan, the first one that the Afghan government had held at the prison. The chief judge sentenced four men to prison for bomb-making, as The New York Times’ Alissa J. Rubin reported, while American lawyers and officers in the next room watched the proceedings on closed-circuit television set.

Handing over the detention system to the Afghans is already underway in other quarters, and the results are mixed. Dozens of Parwan detainees are sent to Pul-e-Charkhi, a facility located outside Kabul that has been renovated with U.S. government funds. Afghan trials are held for some prisoners, although the trials are based on largely evidence collected by the Americans, and the justice is uneven: Afghan guards allegedly pulled 16 men out of their cells one night in 2007 and executed them. Human rights advocates believe that the problems with the detention facilities, and the trials that are being held at Pul-e-Charkhi, are emblematic of a weak justice system that lies at the heart of Afghan instability.

“We are funneling billions of dollars into Afghanistan, and one of the main points of focus is strengthening Afghanistan’s rules of law,” says OSI’s Horowitz. “One of the reasons Afghans have shown sympathy for the Taliban is because of the way they bring speedy, although brutal, form of justice to communities, so even if the U.S. wasn’t handing its detainees and evidence files over to Afghans, there’s strong reason to be concerned about fairness.”

Experts believe that the chances of having an equitable, Afghan-run justice system in place by next year is unlikely. Americans may choose to leave at that point, but afterward the justice system may well deteriorate, sending the country into another downward spiral.

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"Can you repeat that?" Linguistics key to Afghan war effort

WASHINGTON–Last summer, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed a group of 2,000 people who he located at the critical juncture and “at the heart” of the military’s efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
“You are as important as any other undertaking in the US military right now,” Mullen proclaimed.
This wasn’t a talk of weapon systems or traditional war theory, but one centered on what might be the most undervalued tool in the military’s arsenal – language.
Mullen’s newfound indispensible manpower in an interminable and untraditional war are the students and staff at the Monterey, Calif.-based Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center.
Ten years ago, the DLIFC was solely in the business of training linguists for traditional roles.
“Now, we’ve had to branch out,” said Stephen Payne, DLIFC command historian. “We’ve been helping train troops since 2003.”
A premier institution since 1941 — when Japanese-American Soldiers were first trained to become translators and interpreters in World War II — DLIFLC teaches 24 languages to linguists from all four branches of the military, the U.S. Coast Guard and other Department of Defense agencies.
Due to rapid expansion, the DLIFLC hired over 1,000 new faculty members since 2001. Their budget has more than tripled, from $77 million in 2001 to $275 million this year. The center started offering predeployment training for Dari and Pashto in 2007. Since then, there has been a 500 percent increase in enrollment, with 15,000 service members trained in just 2009.
Most recently, the center partnered with the army to host “Language Training Detachments” to better prepare troops to meet the demands of an increasingly involved war in Afghanistan. Fort Campbell in Kentucky, Fort Carson in Colorado and Fort Drum in New York are the first installations to start the program. DLI hopes to add 14 permanent Language Training Detachments for the General Purpose Force in the next year.
Last weekend, 73 soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell graduated from the first 16-week course in Pashto and Dari, the official languages of the South Asian country.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai capped his four-day US trip last month with a visit to the post. The United States already has sent three brigades to Afghanistan and three more are expected to deploy in the coming months, totaling around 20,000 troops.
Sgt. Audreuna Cleveland, the only female in the Dari class, was deployed to Iraq in November 2007 and served there for a year.
“I didn’t know any Arabic and I realized it was almost essential in winning the hearts and minds of the people,” said Cleveland, who will be deployed to Afghanistan in the next few months.
This time around, with a basic level of conversational language skills in her arsenal, Cleveland hopes the operation in Afghanistan will be different.
“If I at least know the language and culture, I’ll be able to establish relationships with the Afghan people.”
Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s call last November for more soldiers on the ground with language capabilities under the  “Campaign Continuity” initiative is expected to enhance the Army’s ability to partner with Afghan National Security Forces and local Afghan communities.
McChrystal, who commands all Afghanistan war operations, says his goal is to have one leader in every platoon who will interact with the Afghan population. We’re talking more than “hello’s” and “thank yous.” The concept calls for building rapport with Afghan nationals by engaging them in meaningful conversations.
“We didn’t take this approach in the first years of the present conflicts,” said Payne. “We went in with the idea we’d overthrow the governments and ‘Gee, it would be great.’ We had no training going in, and when the next phase hit, we weren’t prepared.”
Col. Danial D. Pick, the commandant for DLI, said McChrystal’s directive has ushered in a much-needed sea change.
“This might be the most systematic and intense language training provided to army units,” said Pick, “and it’s necessary in winning the war in Afghanistan.”
But complex is always the keyword in a conversation on Afghanistan.
The country’s terrain is as varied as its ethno-linguistic populations, with more languages and dialects than in Iraq.
Pick notes Dari and Pashto only truly came on the linguistic radar after 9/11 and sustaining access to high quality translators and interpreters has been more tenuous – both in America and in Afghanistan — than in previous wars.
And with a fabled history of invaders stretching back to Alexander the Great, Afghans are traditionally suspect of  foreigners.
“We’re still trying to figure out the best ways to tap human capital in Afghanistan,” said Pick.
The linguistic development of troops isn’t a skill that can be taught overnight.
“Commanders have to give us a valuable resource – time,” said Sgt. 1st Class Brian Lamar, the school’s spokesman. “And sometimes that’s difficult when you only have six months of training before deployment and you have Joe Private who doesn’t really know much about Afghanistan.”
A soldier in a war like Afghanistan that once seemed like a cakewalk, doesn’t just dodge bullets. He or she attends Shuras and talks to village elders about governance, economics, and security.
And when dealing with counterinsurgency doctrine under McChrystal’s direction, no training is more crucial to the military than education in critical languages and cultures.
“Just to be able to watch the Afghan news and know what people are saying means a lot to them,” said Army Captain Victor R. Vera, who’s enrolled in the Dari class at Fort Campbell.
The Department of Defense recently created a program, AFPAK HANDS, through which mid- and senior- level officers attend language training, usually in DC, for four months prior to deployment to Afghanistan.  The focus is on building a base of officers with language skills to work on Afghanistan and Pakistan issues, alternating between assignments overseas and in the US.
“Bottom line is we need to learn lessons from the past and soldiers need to realize they’re going into a completely different cultural situation where they need to be equipped,” said Pick. “They’re not in Iowa anymore.”
Staff Sgt. Genevieve Chase, who served in combat operations in Afghanistan in 2006, said she would have benefitted from more pre-deployment familiarization programs and language training.
“This is a war very much about relationships,” said Chase, who often went outside the wire and worked with tribal elders.
“We’re never going to win if we don’t even know how talk to the people.”

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U.S. Peace Institute takes Afghanistan discussion to web viewers

WASHINGTON–The majority of the public moments of Hamid Karzai’s recent four-day visit to the United States consisted of little more than ceremony, photographs, hand-shaking and smiles. The press had few opportunities to ask questions of the Afghan president or gain insight into what he and U.S. officials discussed during sessions held behind closed doors.

However, on May 13, the last day of his visit, Karzai and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton not only took questions, they had a public discussion before an audience of hundreds–both in person and on the web. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted the conversation between Clinton and Karzai, moderated by William Taylor, vice president of the organization’s Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations.

Not only was the structure of the event more casual than any of the events earlier in his visit, it was open and on display. The government-affiliated organization estimates that an audience of approximately 180 in-person attendees and hundreds of viewers of the real-time webcast of the event were party to the discussion.

“I think using the webcast was hugely important,” said Dida Atasi, online communications specialist at USIP. “[Karzai] having agreed to speak at a think-tank like USIP opens up [the conversation of peace] to begin with. Online is one small part. Proliferating that through different channels- reporters, people tweeting, members of the Afghan delegation watching- these factors come together to make it communication.”

Member of USIP were also live-tweeting the event. Many of the organization’s Twitter followers posted and re-tweeted questions and comments about the discussion and began analyzing and criticizing the conversation as it happened, and USIP was listening.

“People were interacting real-time on Twitter,” Atasi said. “When our moderator mentioned a report and we immediately put up a link to that report and sent it out through Twitter. A lot of people were re-tweeting and putting in their own commentary.”

Atasi said the online engagement was a really interesting way for people to feel engaged in discussions of peace strategy instead of watching from the outside. From issues of womens’ rights in Afghan culture to the controversial issue of reintegrating Taliban fighters into Afghan society, Twitter users across the web interacted with the conversation as it happened in DC.

“Short answer: they’re good boys, really! they were just misled! I think I saw this movie. It was called ‘west side story’,” said one commenter of Taliban reintegration. The comment spurred several responses and criticism.

“If you’re flipping through a channel and you see Karzai, you don’t think there’s anything you can do about it,” Atasi said. “When people see they can participate without having to leave their chair they do.”

USIP plans to continue providing webcasts of its events in the hope of providing a forum for a peace-centric discussion of national security. Their website http://www.usip.org/events has links to upcoming events and they can be found on Twitter at @USIP.

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From eradication to assent: U.S. policy on opium crops

WASHINGTON–In the transition to the Obama Administration from the Bush Administration, freshly appointed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appointed Richard Holbrooke as the Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. With that move, U.S. global counternarcotics policy – regarding Afghan poppy farming in particular – took a sharp turn. Troops stemmed the practice of destroying poppy crops, concentrating on education, giving farmers alternatives and targeting drug traffickers, among other non-forcible eradication practices.

This recent video shows just how far that policy has set in, with U.S. soldiers not only permitting poppy farming but essentially helping Afghan farmers grow the crop.

Although some soldiers and Afghans see progress in various areas, many criticize the tacit support of poppy growing, according to a report on the counter-narcotics effort from the inspector general for the State Department.

The concern is that poppies used for the opium trade wind up supporting terrorism. They provide much of the funding for the Taliban, according to estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

The U.S. policy now hopes to prevent that by focusing only on drug traffickers, so as not to affect farmers for whom poppies are their sole livelihood.

Tom Schweich, the U.S. ambassador for counter-narcotics and justice reform in Afghanistan from 2007-08, debates the effectiveness of any policy that fosters poppy growing and does not include at least some amount of eradication.

“That’s like getting rid of a tree by cutting the branches instead of the roots,” Schweich said. The policy adopted by Holbrooke is more politically based than attending to actual situation, according to Schweich, who helped shape policy that included eradication under the Bush Administration. He says there has to be a policy that’ attacks the problem at all levels: cultivation, the process of turning it into heroin, the chemists, traffickers, and people protecting traffickers.

Holbrooke’s office did not respond to questions about the effectiveness of their policy, or the State Department OIG’s criticism by press time.

Tom Gregg, a fellow on the Afghanistan regional project at the Center on International Cooperation, said that moving away from eradication is acknowledging the complexity of the issue. The CIC is part of New York University, where Holbrooke’s senior advisor Barnett Rubin is a director of studies and senior fellow on Afghanistan.

“Fundamentally it’s not as dreadful as an eradication policy,” Gregg said.

The source of drug trafficking and its connection to terrorism dates back to the late 1970s after the collapse of the Afghan state during the Soviet-influenced communist coup. Afghan political-military leaders allied with businessmen engaged across many trades including arms dealing and drugs. Businessmen depended on the strongmen, presumably like the Taliban, and then in exchange gave them money.

The UNODC said that the Taliban and “other anti-government forces” made $50 million to $70 million by charging farmers something like at 10 percent fee on their crops. Also, levies imposed on opium processing and trafficking may have raised an additional $200-$400 million. In addition to revenue, drug traffickers provide insurgents material support, including vehicles, weapons, and shelter.

It’s not so easy to go back now, however. The World Bank’s Department for International Intelligence describes the nuances of trying to reverse the proliferation of poppy farming amid the continuing/escalating turbulence. Security incidents in Afghanistan have increased every year since 2003, and in 2009 there was another sharp rise in security incidents.

Meanwhile, some farmers have lost the skills to live off of crops – raisins (See DII report pg. 15) are just one example – and therefore the comparative advantage has gone down. Consequently, switching a farmer back to such benign crops becomes a chore.

So too is it difficult to pin down the demographic that is impacted by eradication. Rubin and others in the Holbrooke camp underscore the dire economic situation for those who would lose their incomes and the anti-American sentiment eradication creates, thus fueling insurgency. Schweich says that it is in part misleading, as farmers who grow poppies don’t do so out of need.

“It’s not poverty that is driving this, it’s greed in most cases,” he said.

A 2008 UNODC report does say that poverty is not a driving factor in creating an opium boom; rather it is more a combination of under-resourced governments and ongoing insurgencies. Data from the NODC shows that poppy growing in Afghanistan exploded after 9/11 to its record high of 193,000 hectares in 2007, before beginning to decline again.

Now the poppy harvest is decreasing for the third year in a row, only the most recent one coming under the Obama administration. And the decline under Obama is largely due to a naturally-occurring fungus that has destroyed opium crops.

Though Afghanistan produced 90 percent of the world’s opium, the vast majority of farmers grow something other than poppies. Only 6.4 percent of the total population or 12.9 percent of the rural population was involved in poppy cultivation (UNODC survey, pg. 76).

What’s more, in Afghanistan, it’s actually against the Constitution to grow or cultivate poppies. So permitting poppy growing could send the wrong message to other Afghan farmers who are not growing poppies, Schweich suggests, in essence telling farmers it’s OK to violate the constitution, and it undermining the very rule of law they’re trying to establish.

“It’s a preposterous mixed message with no chance of long-term success,” he said.

Gregg admits though there are a number of contradictions in the international approach, such as the inequitable distribution of the foreign dollar in Afghanistan. The insurgency is in the South and Southeast, he says, where a lot of the foreign aid goes. “In some ways is rewarding bad behavior,” Gregg said. Some of what the military needs to do is to identify the swing provinces, he recommended, first award areas that aren’t growing poppies.

It may be that the previous policy of eradication – which could only be executed with force-protected, ground-based eradication and not aerial sprays – could be done better. But it was not in and of itself a bad policy, according to Schweich.

“The central poppy eradication force was inefficient. There’s no doubt about that. However, an eradication component to a comprehensive counternarcotics policy remains essential,” he said.

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Afghan leader’s visit succeeds in showing unity, but comes up short on strategy

by Jessica Binsch, Medill News Service for UPI.com on 05/12/10

WASHINGTON – It would be difficult to tell that the U.S. and Afghanistan had any disagreements if you followed Afghan President Hamid Karzai around Washington this week.

His visit was characterized by attempts to demonstrate unity after recent public criticism had strained the relationship between the two countries.

Leaders from both sides now tried to cast their past troubles as signs of a maturing relationship. The administration also stressed the long-term commitment of the U.S. to Afghanistan.

“Obviously there are going to be tensions in such a complicated and difficult environment and in a situation in which on the ground both Afghans and Americans are making enormous sacrifices,” President Barack Obama said at a joint press conference with Karzai on Wednesday. He said the two countries would be more frank with each other in the future.

“Every bilateral relationship, especially one as close as with Afghanistan, experiences ups and downs,” Karl Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador in Afghanistan, said this week. Last year, Eikenberry had doubted Karzai’s viability as a partner to the U.S. in a message to Washington that was leaked in the media. But at the start of Karzai’s visit on Monday, he said the U.S. and Afghanistan are “able to work our way through difficulties and come back together. I think we’re going to emerge an even better alliance.”

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose similar language to describe the strained relationship. “The ability to disagree on issues of importance … is not an obstacle to achieving our shared objectives,” Clinton said Tuesday. “Rather, it reflects a level of trust that is essential to any meaningful dialogue and enduring strategic partnership.”

Tensions had escalated surrounding Obama’s visit to Kabul in late March. U.S. officials criticized that the Karzai government wasn’t doing enough to fight corruption; Karzai bristled at what he saw as U.S. attempts to undercut his authority.

Numerous photo opportunities were meant to convey an image of strong ties. Obama and Karzai held a rare joint news conference at the stately East Room of the White House, and Clinton, who already appeared with the Afghan presidentat the State Department, plans to meet again with Karzai before he leaves Washington.
Experts say the visit served its purpose.

“These meetings are aimed at setting a new tone after what has been a difficult spring for U.S.-Afghan relations,” said Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, a liberal Washington think tank.

Part of that was Karzai’s acknowledgement of U.S. sacrifices made in his country. On Thursday, the Afghan president paid his respects to the fallen at Arlington National Cemetery. He was accompanied by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his walk along the graves of U.S. service members that died in the country’s wars, including in Afghanistan.

Earlier this week, Karzai visited Walter Reed Army Medical Center to speak with wounded warriors. He said seeing young soldiers who had lost limbs in the war was “heart-rending.”

The U.S. is trying to reduce civilian casualties in Afghanistan, Obama said. “When there is a civilian casualty, that is not just a political problem for me.” He stressed that U.S. troops are often taking risks to avoid civilian deaths.

Obama warned that fighting would increase – the U.S. is leading a campaign for Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city – but reiterated his plan to begin withdrawing troops by summer 2011.

Despite this timeline, the road ahead remains unclear. A report by Katulis’ organization, the Center for American Progress, criticized the Obama administration for lacking a clear vision of a post-war Afghanistan. When strengthening the Afghan state had been a lower priority at first, it has now become one of the central aims of U.S. strategy –without a distinct vision on how to achieve that, the report said.

“We don’t have a clear idea on the metrics of how we measure progress,” Katulis said. The report also criticizes the heavy focus on a military approach. Both Obama and Clinton pointed to the increase of civilians on the ground in Afghanistan, but the U.S. presence remains heavily tilted in favor of the military. By this summer, roughly 100,000 troops will be in Afghanistan, compared with about 1,000 civilian experts.

One of the issues remaining to be resolved is how to integrate Taliban foot soldiers back into Afghan society. Karzai said at the news conference with Obama that thousands of low-level Taliban could be persuaded to lay down their arms and support the Afghan government. But popular support for the Afghan government prevails in only a small number of key provinces, according to a recent report on progress in the country compiled by the Pentagon.

Despite the positive tone the two countries struck this week, Obama was candid about the challenges. “There are many difficult days ahead in Afghanistan,” Obama said.

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Obama: US on right track in Afghanistan, but struggle against Taliban remains difficult

by Jessica Binsch, Medill News Service for UPI.com on 05/12/10

WASHINGTON – While acknowledging that the fight ahead will be difficult, President Barack Obama said Wednesday he expects to meet his timeline and begin drawing down U.S. troops in Afghanistan by the summer of 2011.

At a joint press conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in the East Room of the White House, Obama said the situation would get worse before it gets better.

“What I’ve tried to emphasize,” Obama said, “is the fact that there is going to be some hard fighting over the next several months.” The international forces in Afghanistan are getting ready to retake Kandahar, the country’s second largest city, in what is expected to be a tough battle.

Obama said,U.S. forces are beginning to reverse the momentum of the insurgency: “We are steadily making progress.”

By Diane Rusignola

Karzai looks on as Obama speaks to reporters Wednesday at the White House.

The American president emphasized the administration’s approach near the end of the event “I am more convinced than ever that we have found a difficult but appropriate strategy.”

This strategy will also include Afghanistan’s neighbor Pakistan, where Taliban fighters were able to take refuge in the past. Obama said Pakistani leaders are recognizing that extremist strongholds along their border are threatening Pakistan’s sovereignty and security. The country is now engaged in a military campaign against extremists in their border regions.

To stabilize and secure Afghanistan, Obama stressed that a civilian component is increasingly important, especially when troops begin to leave.

“We can’t win with a military strategy alone,” Obama said, adding that a long-term strategy has to include a civilian component.

“More American civilians and experts are now partnering with their Afghan colleagues,” he said. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry have said that the number of U.S. civilians has tripled in the last year, now coming to1,000. However, the military presence still far outweighs the civilian, with an additional 30,000 troops alone set to be in Afghanistan by this summer as part of Obama’s surge.

The administration has said it aims to begin the drawback by July 2011. Obama said he is confident this timeline will be met, but that the U.S. will continue to invest resources in Afghanistan.

“Even as we begin to transition security responsibility to Afghans over the next year, we will sustain a robust commitment in Afghanistan going forward,” Obama said.

On the issue of reconciliation with Taliban foot soldiers, Obama said the process has to be led by the Afghans. He expects a peace conference of Afghan leaders this summer to clarify the specifics of that process.

A draft of a plan for reintegration of low-level Taliban fighters calls for investments of $160 million funded by the U.S., the U.K. and Japan, among others. The U.S. has stressed preconditions for Afghan insurgents rejoin mainstream society. Among those are that fighters put down their weapons and denounce violence, as well asaccept the Afghan constitution and government.

Despite assurances that the Afghan government will lead the process, experts think the U.S. will be heavily involved. “The U.S. has to be fully on board because it is the U.S. blood and treasure that is being invested in Afghanistan,” said Lisa Curtis, a senior research fellow with the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington-based think tank. “The U.S. and the Karzai administration have to work hand in glove.”

According to the draft, the reconciliation program would at first focus on a number of provinces across Afghanistan such as Helmand and Kandahar in the South or Kunduz in the North. Fighters willing to lay down their arms may be channeled through a demobilization center before they return to their villages, which would receive aid and investments in infrastructure.

At the press conference, both leaders sought to demonstrate unity and partnership. Tensions between the two countries that made headlines in recent months have been “simply overstated,” Obama said. “Obviously there are going to be tensions in such a complicated and difficult environment and in a situation in which on the ground both Afghans and Americans are making enormous sacrifices.”

Karzai said the two presidents discussed efforts to reduce civilian casualties “in great detail in a very frank and productive manner.” The Afghan government in the past has asked U.S. forces to step up efforts to ensure the protection of civilians.

“When there is a civilian casualty, that is not just a political problem for me,” Obama said. “I am ultimately accountable, just as General (Stanley) McChrystal is accountable, for somebody who is not on the battlefield getting killed.”

Karzai visited the Walter Reed Army Medical Center Tuesday and said it was heart-rending for him to see wounded soldiers. He thanked the American people for their commitment. “The work that we have done promises a better future for Afghanistan,” he said.

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Audience demographic: UPI is a provider of critical information to media outlets, businesses, governments and researchers worldwide.
Brief profile: The news wire’s daily coverage today includes domestic and international top news, business, entertainment, sports, science, health and “Quirks in the News” through its traditional NewsTrack newswire, as well as coverage and analysis of emerging threats, the security industry and energy resources through its premium service.

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